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Although security plays an important role in the development of multiagent systems, a careful 
analysis of software development processes shows that the definition of security requirements is, 
usually, considered after the design of the system. One of the reasons is the fact that agent oriented 
software engineering methodologies have not integrated security concerns throughout their 
developing stages. The integration of security concerns during the whole range of the development 
stages can help towards the development of more secure multiagent systems. In this paper we 
introduce extensions to the Tropos methodology to enable it to model security concerns throughout 
the whole development process. A description of the new concepts and modelling activities is given 
along with a discussion on how these concepts and modelling activities are integrated to the current 
stages of Tropos. A real life case study from the health and social care sector is used to illustrate the 
approach. 
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1.   Introduction 
Work within the agent research community has led towards the development of the Agent 
Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) paradigm. AOSE introduces an alternative 
approach in analysing and designing complex distributed computerised systems [24, 43, 
21], according to which a complex computerised system is viewed as a multiagent system 
[43], in which a collection of autonomous software agents (subsystems) interact with 
each other in order to satisfy their design objectives. Therefore, developers view the 
system as a society, similar to a human society, consisting of entities that possess 
characteristics similar to humans such as mobility, intelligence and the capability of 
communicating [33].  
Due to these characteristics, agent oriented systems are gaining popularity in different 
areas of our everyday life, such as military, health care, education, finance and 
transportation. As a result, these systems include information related to many aspects of 
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someone’s private life, such as bank accounts, educational qualifications, and health 
records.  
Security has been identified as an important issue [22, 33] for the widespread use of 
agent technology. However, the common approach towards the inclusion of security 
within an agent oriented system is to identify security requirements after the definition of 
the system [12, 30, 35]. This typically means that security enforcement mechanisms have 
to be fitted into a pre-existing design. This approach leads to serious design challenges 
that usually translate into the emergence of computer systems afflicted with security 
vulnerabilities [1, 39].  
Research efforts, so far, have mainly focused on the solution of individual security 
problems, such as attacks from an agent to another agent; attacks from a platform to an 
agent; and attacks from an agent to a platform [23]. In general, developers of agent 
oriented methodologies have neglected security and although the agent oriented software 
engineering is progressing rapidly and many agent oriented methodologies [13, 17, 20, 
21, 42, 44] have developed during the last few years; agent oriented software engineering 
practices and methodologies do not meet the needs for resolving the security related 
problems, and fail to provide evidence of successfully integrating security concerns.  As a 
result, developers find no help when considering security during the development of 
multiagent systems.  
In this paper we extend the Tropos methodology to enable developers to consider 
security issues during the software development process. Our aim is to provide an easy to 
use development methodology that will allow developers (1) to integrate security related 
analysis in order to identify desirable security aspects (2) reason about these aspects and 
(3) develop a system that is composed of agents able to satisfy the desirable security 
aspects of the system. It is not our aim to provide a methodology to analyze specific 
security protocols and mechanisms. Although, this is an important area, it is outside the 
scope of our work.  
The paper, which is an extended and revised version of [33] and integrates results 
from [34, 35], is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the relation between security 
and agent oriented software engineering and it discusses related work. Section 3 provides 
an overview of the Tropos methodology, whereas in Section 4 we present the security-
related extensions to the Tropos methodology. Section 5 describes how the proposed 
extensions are integrated within the development stages of the Tropos methodology and 
it illustrates the extensions with the aid of an example taken from the health and social 
care sector. Section 6 concludes this paper and presents directions for future work.  
2.   Security and Agent Oriented Software Engineering 
Security of computer based information systems is concerned with methods providing 
cost effective and operationally effective protection of information systems from 
undesirable events [28]. In principle, security is usually defined in terms of the existence 
of confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control, non repudiation and 
availability. Each of these properties is considered during the development of systems for 
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different reasons. However, most of the times, the development of a system would 
require the consideration of more than one of these properties.   
As Anderson claims [1], “security engineering is about building systems to remain 
dependable in the face of malice, error or mischance”. The process of securing an 
information system is usually a trade off between security requirements and other non-
functional1 and functional requirements. Security requirements are usually considered 
non-functional requirements [10], and they are defined as “a manifestation of a high-level 
organisational policy into the detailed requirements of a specific system” [12].  
Nevertheless, differently than other non-functional requirements, such as reliability 
and performance, for which software engineers have recognised the need to integrate into 
the software development processes [11]; security still remains an afterthought and the 
usual approach towards the inclusion of security within a system is to identify security 
requirements after the definition of a system or to consider security only in certain stages 
of the development process. However, this approach often leads to problems [1], since 
security mechanisms have to be fitted into a pre-existing design, therefore leading to 
serious design challenges that usually translate into software vulnerabilities [39]. 
Literature provides many examples of security disasters that took place while trying to 
upgrade non-secure systems to secure systems (see for instance [4]).  
To eliminate the above development mismatches, which result from the lack of 
security consideration during the development process, we believe security should be 
considered during the whole development process and it should be defined together with 
the requirements specification. Taking security into account along with the functional 
requirements throughout the development stages helps to limit the cases of conflict, 
between security and functional requirements, by identifying them very early in the 
system development, and find ways to overcome them. This argument is also supported 
in the literature [12, 26, 41]. However, to consider security issues throughout the 
development process of a software system, software engineering methodologies must 
provide developers with models and processes to help them model security concerns.  
The agent oriented software engineering paradigm presents a feasible approach for 
the integration of security into software engineering. This is due to the appropriateness of 
agent oriented philosophy, for dealing with security issues that exist in a computer 
system. Security requirements are mainly obtained by analysing the attitude of the 
organisation towards security and after studying the security policy of the organisation. 
As mentioned in [25] agents act on behalf of individuals or companies interacting 
according to an underlying organisation context. The integration of security within this 
context will require for the rest of the subsystems (agents) to consider the security 
requirements, when specifying their objectives and interactions therefore causing the 
propagation of security requirements to the rest of the subsystems. In addition, the agent 
oriented view is perhaps the most natural way of characterising security issues in 
                                                          
1
 Non-functional requirements introduce quality characteristics, but they also represent constraints under which 
the system must operate [37, 38]. 
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software systems. Characteristics, such as autonomy, intentionality and sociality, 
provided by the use of agent orientation allow developers first to model the security 
requirements in high-level, and then incrementally transform these requirements to 
security mechanisms.  
However, current agent oriented methodologies do not meet the needs for resolving 
the security related problems [41], and fail to provide evidence of integrating successfully 
security concerns throughout the whole range of the development process. In other 
words, they fail to adequately provide a security-oriented approach in the development of 
agent oriented software systems. Nevertheless, recently, work has initiated towards the 
solution of this problem. 
Liu et al. [29] have presented work to identify security requirements during the 
development of multiagent systems by analysing the relationships between strategic 
actors, such as users and stakeholders, and potential attackers. In this work, three 
different types of analysis techniques are proposed: agent oriented, goal oriented and 
scenario based analysis. In addition, Yu and Cysneiros [45] provide an approach to model 
and reason about non-functional requirements (with emphasis on privacy and security). 
They are using the concept of soft-goal to assess different design alternatives, and they 
determine how each of these alternatives contributes in achieving the soft-goal.  
Both of these works are mainly focused on the requirements analysis area and not on 
the whole development process. In addition, both Liu and Yu employ the concept of soft-
goal to help them in their analysis. Although soft-goals can support the security related 
analysis of the system during the requirements analysis stage, they do not provide enough 
detail when considering security in the later stages of the development process. 
Therefore, as it has been argued in the literature [31], the concept of soft-goal does not 
adequately model security issues throughout the development process.  
Moreover, Huget [19] proposes a new agent oriented methodology, called Nemo, and 
he claims that it tackles security. In his approach, security is not considered as a specific 
model but it is included within the other models of the methodology. Nemo is a new 
methodology and as a result it has not presented in the literature enough to allow a 
thorough examination. However, from our point of view, the methodology tackles 
security quite superficial and as the developer states “particularly, security has to be 
intertwined more deeply within models” [19]. Therefore, more evidence will be required 
to satisfy the claim of the developer that the methodology tackles security. 
In addition, Giorgini at al. have introduced in [15] an enhancement of Tropos / i* that 
is based on the clear separation of roles in a dependency relation between those offering a 
service (the merchant processing a credit card number), those requesting the service (the 
bank debiting the payment), and those owning the very same data (the cardholder). In 
[16] they have proposed a PKI/trust management requirements specification and analysis 
framework based on the clear separation of trust and delegation relationship.  However, 
the analysis produced by these approaches results in a high level analysis of security 
properties and they lack a well defined process to transform such high level analysis to 
operational security properties of the agents of the system.  
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In addition to the above approaches, a large number of related works comes from 
close disciplinary areas such as requirements engineering [10, 11] object oriented 
software engineering [26, 27, 30, 49, 52, 55] and patterns [54]. These approaches provide 
a first step towards the integration of security and software engineering and have been 
found helpful in modelling security requirements. However, they only guide the way 
security can be handled within a certain stage of the software development process. For 
example, McDermott and Fox’s approach [49] is used only during the requirements 
analysis, whereas Jurgen’s analysis [27] take place in a fairly low level and it is suited to 
a more operational analysis. In other words, Jurgen’s approach is only applicable during 
the design stage. 
Differently than the presented related work, this paper proposes an approach that 
covers the whole development process using the same concepts and notations. As argued 
earlier, considering security issues throughout the development process by using the 
same concepts and notations is very important when developing software systems with 
security on mind.  
3.   Tropos 
For our work, we have decided to extend the Tropos methodology, rather than 
creating a new methodology from scratch. This decision took place because we are 
interested in enabling an agent oriented software engineering methodology to model 
security, rather than creating one more methodology on the (already) large amount of 
existing ones [13,17,20,21,42,44]. Moreover, the decision [35] to extend Tropos amongst 
all the other available agent oriented software engineering methodologies was based on 
the fact that Tropos spans in all the development stages using the same concepts; it is 
easily extensible and it is more security-aware than other agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies [35]. In addition, the Tropos methodology is well integrated 
with other approaches, such as the UML, in which some security work has taken place 
[26, 27, 30], and therefore existing work can be considered and incorporated within the 
proposed approach. Moreover, the modelling concepts of Tropos are well suited to model 
security requirements, which are usually expressed using notions such as agents and high 
level goals such as confidentiality and authentication [15]. 
Tropos2 is a novel agent oriented software engineering methodology tailored to 
describe both the organisational environment of a multiagent system and the system 
itself. Tropos is characterised by three key aspects [9, 36, 17, 8]. Firstly, it deals with all 
the phases (requirements analysis, system design and implementation) of a system 
development, adopting a uniform and homogeneous way that it is based on the notion of 
agents and all the related mentalistic notions, such as actors, goals, tasks, resources, and 
intentional dependencies. Secondly, Tropos pays a great deal of attention to the early 
requirements, emphasising the need to understand not only what organisational goals are 
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 The name Tropos derives from the Greek “” which means “way of doing things” but also has the 
connotation of “easily changeable, easily adaptable”.  
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required but also how and why the intended system would meet its organisational goals. 
Thirdly, Tropos is based on the idea of building a model of the system that is 
incrementally refined and extended from a conceptual level to executable artefacts, by 
means of a sequence of transformational steps [6, 7].  Such transformations allow 
developers to perform precise inspections of the development process by detailing the 
higher level notions introduced in the previous stages of the development.  
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [46], which uses the concepts of actors, 
goals and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to other 
actors (dependers). This means the multiagent system and its environment are viewed as 
a set of actors, who depend on other actors to help them fulfil their goals. An actor [46] 
represents an entity that has intentionality and strategic goals within the multiagent 
system or within its organisational setting. A role represents an abstract characterisation 
of the behaviour of a social actor within some specialised context or domain of endeavour 
[46]. A position represents a set of roles, typically played by one agent. A (hard) goal 
[46] represents a condition in the world that an actor would like to achieve. In other 
words, goals represent actors’ strategic interests. In Tropos, the concept of hard-goal 
(simply goal hereafter) is differentiated from the concept of soft-goal.  A soft-goal is used 
to capture non-functional requirements of the system, and unlike a (hard) goal, it does not 
have clear criteria for deciding whether it is satisfied or not and therefore it is subject to 
interpretation [46]. For instance, an example of soft-goal is “the system should be 
scalable”. A task (also called plan in Tropos) represents, at an abstract level, a way of 
doing something [17]. The fulfilment of a task can be a means for satisfying a goal, or for 
contributing towards the satisficing of a soft-goal. In Tropos different (alternative) tasks, 
that actors might employ to achieve their goals, are modelled. Therefore developers can 
reason about the different ways that actors can achieve their goals and decide for the best 
possible way. A resource [17] presents a physical or informational entity that one of the 
actors requires. The main concern when dealing with resources is whether the resource is 
available and who is responsible for its delivery. A dependency [46] between two actors 
represents that one actor depends on the other to attain some goal, execute a task, or 
deliver a resource. The depending actor is called the depender and the actor who is 
depended upon is called the dependee. The type of dependency describes the nature of an 
agreement (called dependum) between dependee and depender. A capability [17] 
represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and executing a task for the 
fulfilment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in presence of a specific event.  
Figure 1 depicts a graphical representation of the above-mentioned concepts as used in 
the Tropos methodology. 
Tropos methodology covers five main software development stages: Early and Late 
Requirements analysis, Architectural design, Detailed design, and Implementation. Both 
early and late requirements analysis share the same methodological approach. As a result, 
most of the ideas and concepts used during the early requirements are also used during 
the late requirements. The Tropos process is presented in detail in [8]. 
 












Fig. 1. The concepts of the Tropos methodology 
4.   Extending Tropos with security related concepts  
The Tropos methodology partially [31] tackles security modelling by allowing 
developers to capture security requirements, as well as other non-functional requirements, 
as soft-goals.  The usage of soft-goals to model general non-functional requirements 
although it allows developers to define, to some extent, together security and other 
functional and non-functional requirements, it does not help in providing a clear 
distinction between security and the other requirements of the system [35]. Such a 
distinction is made even harder by the lack of definition of the Tropos concepts, such as 
goals, tasks, and dependencies, with security in mind. Moreover, as discussed in previous 
work [31], although the current Tropos concepts allow clear identification of the 
dependencies between the actors; some possible (security) constraints that might be 
imposed to some of these actors are not captured. The lack of modelling such constraints 
results in an analysis, and eventually in a design, that lacks essential (security) 
information and it restricts the modelling of security properties during the system 
development. In addition, the methodology fails to integrate security modelling during 
the early requirements analysis stage, since the modelling of security requirements as soft 
goals is introduced during the analysis of the system-to-be (architectural design stage). 
However, all the actors play an important role with respect to the security of the system 
and all of them should be analysed with security in mind.   
4.1.   THE SECURE CONCEPTS 
As discussed in the previous section, the current ontology of the Tropos methodology 
fails to adequately model security during the development process of a multiagent 
system. To enable developers to adequately capture security requirements we introduce 
the concept of constraint and we extend it with respect to security. In addition, the Tropos 
concepts of dependency, goal, task, resource, and capability are also extended with 
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security in mind. This section aims to describe these newly introduced and extended 
concepts, which are defined within the Tropos project as secure concepts.   
4.1.1.   Constraint and Security Constraint 
Constraints can represent a set of restrictions that do not permit specific actions to be 
taken or prevent certain objectives from being achieved and more often [40] are 
integrated in the specification of existing textual descriptions. Because of its importance 
in the system development, the concept of constraint has been introduced to the Tropos 
methodology as a separate concept [35], and the meta-model of the Tropos modelling 
language has been extended by introducing the construct for modelling constraints [35].  
For the purposes of our work, we introduce the concept of security constraint. A 
security constraint is captured through a specialization of constraint and it is defined as a 
restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, which 
can influence the analysis and design of a multiagent system under development by 
restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the 
requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives.  
It is worth mentioning that in our work, security constraints do not represent specific 
security protocol restrictions, which should be specified during the implementation of the 
system, and not during the analysis and design, but they contribute to a higher level of 
abstraction. This higher level of abstraction allows for a generalised design free of 
models biased to particular implementation languages. 
Graphically, security constraints are modelled as illustrated in Figure 2; as clouds 
within which the description of the (security) constraint is shown.  
4.1.2.   Secure Dependency  
A secure dependency [35] introduces security constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the 
dependency to be satisfied. Both the depender and the dependee must agree for the 
fulfilment of the security constraint in order for the secure dependency to be valid. That 
means the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security constraint(s) and 
also that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying the 
security constraint(s). We define three different types of secure dependency. In a 
dependee secure dependency (see Figure 2-a), the depender depends on the dependee and 
the dependee introduces security constraint(s) for the dependency. In a depender secure 
dependency (see 2-b), the depender depends on the dependee and the depender introduces 
security constraint(s) for the dependency. In a double secure dependency, the depender 
depends on the dependee and both the depender and the dependee introduce security 
constraints for the dependency. Both must satisfy the security constraints introduced to 
achieve the secure dependency (see 2-c). 
 


















Fig. 2. Secure dependencies 
4.1.3.    Secure Entities 
In our work, we use the term secure entity to represent a secure goal, a secure task or a 
secure resource. A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect to 
security. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve possible security 
constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. However, a secure goal 
does not particularly define how the security constraints can be achieved, since 
alternatives can be considered. The precise definition of how the secure goal can be 
achieved is given by a secure task.  A secure task is defined as a task that represents a 
particular way for satisfying a secure goal. A secure resource can be defined as an 
informational entity that is related to the security of the multiagent system. A secure 
capability represents the ability of an actor/agent to achieve a secure goal, carry out a 
secure task and/or deliver a secure resource. The graphical representation of the Tropos 
entities has been extended to enable modelling of secure entities. Secure entities are 
indicated by the presence of an S within brackets before the description of the entity as 





Fig. 3. Secure Entities 
4.2.    SECURITY MODELLING ACTIVITIES 
The above-presented secure concepts form the basis of modelling security within the 
Tropos methodology. However, to make use of the above concepts different modelling 
(a) Dependee Secure Dependency 
(b) Depender Secure Dependency 
(c) Double Secure Dependency 
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activities contribute to the capturing and the analysis of the security requirements of a 
multiagent system. There are four main modelling activities: the security reference 
modelling, the security constraints modelling, the secure entities modelling and the 
secure capability modelling. The following sections briefly describe each one of those3.  
4.2.1.    Security Reference Modelling 
The security reference modelling involves the identification of security needs of the 
system-to-be, problems related to the security of the system, such as threats and 
vulnerabilities, and also possible solutions (usually these solutions are identified in terms 
of a security policy that the organisation might have) to the security problems. During the 
security reference modelling activity, the security reference diagram is constructed, after 
analysing the security requirements of the system-to-be and its environment. The main 
purpose of the security reference modelling is to allow flexibility during the development 
stages of a multiagent system and also to save time and effort. Many system developers 
face security issues similar to the issues faced by other developers. Therefore the security 
reference diagram can be used as a reference point that can be modified or extended 
according to specific needs of particular systems.  
Although the security reference diagram is constructed during the initial stages of the 
system development, it is not isolated from the rest of the development, since the security 
reference modelling analysis can be used later in the development process to identify 
security constraints that must be introduced to the system-to-be (by taking into account 
the security needs of the system) and also to identify possible means (security 
mechanisms) that contribute towards the satisfaction of the security constraints that are 
introduced to the system. 
During the security reference modelling activity, developers consider the security 
features of the system-to-be, the protection objectives of the system, the security 
mechanisms, and also the threats to the system’s security features. Security features 
represent security-related attributes that the system under development must demonstrate. 
Examples of security features are privacy, availability, and integrity. Protection 
objectives represent a set of principles or rules that contribute towards the achievement of 
the security features. These principles identify possible solutions to the security problems 
and usually they can be found in the form of the security policy of the organisation. 
Examples of protection objectives are authorisation, cryptography and accountability. 
Security mechanisms represent standard security methods for helping towards the 
satisfaction of the protection objectives. Some of these methods are able to prevent 
security attacks, whereas others are able only to detect security breaches. It must be 
noticed that furthered analysis of some security mechanisms is required to allow 
developers to identify possible security sub-mechanisms. A security sub-mechanism 
represents a specific way of achieving a security mechanism. For instance, authentication 
denotes a security mechanism for the fulfilment of a protection objective such as 
                                                          
3
 For a more detailed description please refer to [35] 
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authorisation. However, authentication can be achieved by sub-mechanisms such as 
passwords, digital signatures and biometrics. Threats represent circumstances that have 
the potential to cause loss; or problems that can put in danger the security features of the 
system. Examples of threats are social engineering, password sniffing and eavesdropping 
attacks.   
A graphical representation of the above-mentioned concepts of the security reference 






Fig. 4. Security reference diagram concepts 
Two types of links are employed to connect the above concepts. A positive 
contribution link is used when one node helps in the fulfilment of another, whereas a 
negative contribution link is used when a node contributes towards the denial of another. 
Graphically, a positive contribution link is modelled as an arrow, which points towards 
the node that is satisfied, with a plus (+) whereas a negative contribution link is 
represented as an arrow with a minus (-) as shown in Figure 5. 
Using the above concepts and notations, a developer can construct the security 
reference diagram, according to the security requirements of the system under 
development. However, this construction process can be affected by the security related 
experience of the developer. For more experienced developers, the construction is easier 
to perform and check, whether less security experienced developers might find it more 
difficult. To overcome this kind of mismatch, we have developed a transformation 
system4 to allow developers to precisely inspect, by checking whether or not the diagram 
follows the construction rules, the development of the security reference diagram. 
4.2.2.   Security constraint modelling 
The security constraint modelling involves the modelling of the security constraints 
imposed to the actors and the system, and it allows developers to perform an analysis by 
introducing relationships between the security constraints or a security constraint and its 
context. Security constraint modelling is divided into a number of smaller modelling 
activities such as security constraint delegation, security constraint assignment, and 
security constraint analysis.  Security constraint delegation allows the delegation of a 
security constraint from one actor to another. Security constraints can be imposed to 
actors through a secure dependency. However, it might be the case that one actor 
delegates the responsibility for the satisfaction of a dependency to another actor, and as a 
result the security constraint imposed by the secure dependency is also delegated.   
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 Readers interested in the definition of the transformation system please check Appendix. 
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In cases where a security constraint is not delegated to another actor, the goals of the 
actor the imposed security constraint satisfies must be identified. The assignment of a 
security constraint to a goal is indicated with a contribution link that carries the “restricts” 
tag. This is known as security constraint assignment. When a security constraint is 
imposed to a goal (or task), two analysis processes are employed. Security constraint 
decomposition, which aims to further decompose the security constraint, and secure goal 
introduction, which identifies possible secure goals that the constraint might introduce to 
the system.  
A security constraint can be decomposed into one or more security sub-constraints, 
which define more precisely a security constraint. The decomposed constraint is called 
the “root” constraint, and its satisfaction is implied if and only if all the security sub-
constraints are satisfied. Furthermore, security constraints can introduce goals to an actor. 
This is known as secure goal introduction. The purpose of these goals is to help towards 
the achievement of the security constraint. In other words, during the process of secure 
goal introduction, the developer refines the goals of an actor to allow the satisfaction of a 
security constraint. 
These activities should be combined with Tropos’s original modelling activities when 
developing a system. It depends on the designer to decide which activity must be 
employed at which stage of the system development, since the main aim of these 
activities is not to restrict the designer to a step-by-step development of the system-to-be, 
but rather to provide a framework that allows the developer to go from a high level 
design to a more precise and defined version of the system. 
4.2.3.   Secure entities modelling 
The Secure entities modelling involves the analysis of secure goals, tasks and 
resources identified in a multiagent system, and it is considered complementary to the 
security constraints modelling. Moreover, it follows the same reasoning techniques, such 
as means-end, contribution and decomposition analysis, that Tropos employs for goal and 
task analysis [7]. In particular, during the security entities modelling, means-end analysis 
aims at identifying secure tasks and resources that provide means for achieving a secure 
goal; contribution analysis permits developers to identify secure goals that contribute 
positively or negatively to the secure goal being analysed; and decomposition provides a 
decomposition of a secure goal and/or task into sub-goals and sub-tasks respectively.     
4.2.4.    Secure capability modelling 
The modelling of secure capabilities involves the identification of the secure 
capabilities of the multiagent system’s actors and agents to guarantee the satisfaction of 
the security constraints. Secure capabilities can be identified by considering dependencies 
that involve secure entities in the extended actor diagram. When identified, the secure 
capabilities are furthered specified in terms of plans of particular agents of the system. 
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4.3.   The security process 
There are three main aims when considering security issues throughout the 
development stages of a multiagent system. Firstly to identify the security requirements 
of the system; secondly to develop a design that meets the specified security 
requirements; and thirdly to validate the developed system with respect to security. 
Having the above in mind, the security-oriented process in Secure Tropos is one of 
identifying the security requirements of the multiagent system, transform these 
requirements to a design that satisfies them, and validate the developed system with 
respect to security.  
The first step (takes place during the early and late requirements) in the proposed 
security oriented process aims to identify the security requirements of the system. 
Security requirements are identified by employing the modelling activities described in 
the previous section, such as security reference, security constraints and secure entities 
modelling. In particular, the security constraints imposed to the system and the 
stakeholders, are identified and secure goals and entities, which guarantee the satisfaction 
of the identified security constraints, are imposed to the actors of the system.  
The second step in the process (during architectural and detailed design) consists of 
identifying a design that satisfies the security requirements of the system, as well as its 
functional requirements. To achieve this, agents are identified with the aid of the Tropos 
modelling techniques [8] and secure capabilities that guarantee the satisfaction of the 
security entities identified during the previous step are given to the agents.  It is worth 
mentioning that in this stage, different architectural styles might be used to satisfy the 
functional requirements of the system. However, there should be an evaluation of how 
each of these architectural styles satisfies the security requirements of the system. 
Although, this in general is left to the developers, a process [35] that is based on the 
measure of satisfiability [51] can be employed to determine whether for example a 
mobile agent or a client server architecture is more likely to satisfy the security 
requirements of the system under development. 
The third step of the process is the validation of the developed solution. The secure 
Tropos process allows for two types of validation. A model validation and design 
validation. The model validation involves the validation of the developed models (for 
example, the goal diagram or the actor diagram) with the aid of a set of validation rules 
[35]. It is worth mentioning that the validation rules are divided into two different 
categories, the inter-model rules and the outer model rules, the first allows the validation 
of each model individually, whereas the second allows the validation of the consistency 
between the different developed models. The inner model rules allow developers to 
validate the relationships between the components of the different security related 
models, such as the relationship between the security features and the threats in the 
security reference diagram; to validate the consistency between same components 
appeared in more than one models, such as a security constraint that appears in the actors’ 
model as well as in the goal model; and validate the consistency when delegation of 
components between actors takes place. 
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The design validation aims to validate the developed solution against the security 
policy of the system. A key feature of the Secure Tropos that allows us to perform such a 
validation is the fact that the same secure concepts are used throughout the development 
stage. Moreover, the definition of these concepts allows us to provide a direct map 
between them, and therefore be able to validate whether the proposed security solution 
satisfies the security policy. 
5.   Integrating the proposed extensions to Tropos: the eSAP case study 
The previous section described the proposed security extensions to the Tropos 
methodology. To provide a better understanding of the approach, in this section we 
describe5, with the aid of a real life case study, how the proposed extensions can be 
integrated within the development phases of the Tropos methodology and how they can 
be practically applied. The case study is based on the development of the electronic 
Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system [35], an agent-based health and social care 
system for the effective care of older people. To make this example simpler and more 
understandable, we consider a substantial part of the eSAP system, since our aim is not to 
describe in detail the analysis and design of the eSAP but rather to make the application 
of the proposed security related extensions easier to understand.   
5.1.   Early Requirements 
The early requirements analysis is the first stage of the Tropos methodology and its 
output is an organisational model, which includes relevant actors, and their respective 
dependencies.  
Regarding the proposed extensions, during the early requirements analysis stage the 
security reference diagram is constructed and security constraints are imposed to the 
stakeholders of the system (by other stakeholders). In addition, the imposed security 
constraints are expressed (initially) in high-level statements, and then they are further 
analysed [35] and security entities are introduced to satisfy them.  
 In our case study, we consider five actors. The Professional actor, who represents a 
health and social care professional; the Older Person, who represents a patient over 65; 
the DoH actor, which represents the English Department of Health, the R&D Agency 
actor, which represents a research and development agency interested in obtaining 
medical information for research purposes; and the Benefits Agency, which represents 
an agency that financially helps the older person.  
The first step in the early requirements analysis is the construction of the security 
reference diagram. The main security features of the security reference diagram for the 
                                                          
5
 It is worth mentioning that in the presented case study we have focused our analysis in the security issues, and 
we are not presenting in detail the techniques of the Tropos methodology. Readers interested in this should refer 
to [8]. 
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eSAP system are privacy, integrity and availability [35], and a part of it6 is shown in 
figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Part of the eSAP security reference diagram  
The next step of the process involves the modelling of the stakeholders of the system 
together with their goals, dependencies and security constraints. For this purpose, Tropos 
employs the actor diagram [8].  In such a diagram each node represents an actor, and the 
links between the different actors indicate that one depends on the other to accomplish 
some goals. In addition, the imposed security constraints (by other stakeholders) indicate 
that the actors must satisfy them for the dependencies to be valid. A part of the eSAP case 
study actor diagram is shown in Figure 6. In the eSAP case study, the Professional 
depends on the Older Person to Obtain (Older Person) OP Information; however one 
of the most important and delicate matters for the Older Person (as with any patient) is 
the privacy of their personal medical information and the sharing of it. Thus, most of the 
times, the Professional is imposed a constraint to share this information only if the older 
person’s consent has been obtained. 
Similarly, the Older Person depends on the Benefits Agency to Receive 
Financial Support. However, the Older Person worries about the privacy of their 
finances and as a result they impose a constraint to the Benefits Agency actor, to keep 
their financial information private. Moreover, one of the main goals of the R&D Agency 
                                                          
6
 The illustrated security reference diagram has been constructed after analysing all the different issues 
regarding the security of the eSAP as described in [35]. 
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is to Obtain Clinical Information in order to perform tests and research. To get this 
information the R&D Agency depends on the Professional. However, the Professional 
is imposed a constraint (by the Department of Health) to Keep Patient Anonymity.   
 
Fig. 6. Partial actor diagram for the eSAP case study 
When the stakeholders, their goals, the dependencies between them, and the security 
constraints have been identified, the next step of this phase is to analyse more in depth 
each actor’s goals and the security constraints imposed to them. In addition, secure 
entities are introduced to help towards the satisfaction of the imposed security 
constraints. 
The security analysis starts by assigning the security constraints of the actor, to the 
goals of the actor they (the security constraints) restrict. As indicated in the previous 
sections, this assignment is indicated using a constraint link (a link that has the “restricts” 
tag). 
Consider for instance the Professional actor (see Figure 7). According to the 
analysis that took place in the actor diagram (see Figure 6), the Professional actor has 
been imposed two security constraints (Share Info Only If Consent Achieved and 
Keep Patient Anonymity). By analysing the Professional actor’s goals and tasks, we 
have identified the Share Medical Info goal [32]. However, this goal is restricted by the 
Share Info Only If Consent Achieved constraint imposed to the Professional by the 
Older Person. For the Professional to satisfy the constraint, a secure goal is introduced 
Obtain Older Person Consent. However this goal can be achieved with many different 
ways, for example a Professional can obtain the consent personally or can ask a nurse to 
obtain the consent on their behalf. Therefore, a sub-constraint is introduced, Only Obtain 
Consent Personally. To achieve this sub-constraint the secure goal Personally Obtain 
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Consent is introduced to the actor, which is divided into two sub-tasks: Obtain 
Consent by Mail or Obtain Consent by Phone.   
Fig. 7. Professional actor partial analysis 
 
Moreover, one of the goals of the Professional actor is to Provide Medical 
Information for Research. However, this goal is restricted by the Keep Patient 
Anonymity constraint, which has been imposed to the Professional (see Figure 7). As a 
result, to satisfy this security constraint the secure goal Provide Only anonymous Info 
is introduced to the Professional. 
5.2.    Late Requirements 
When all the actors have been analysed, the next phase involves the analysis of the 
system under development within its operational environment, and along with relevant 
functions, and qualities. The system is introduced as one more actors, to which existing 
actors delegate responsibilities for some of the goals and the dependencies that they 
cannot satisfy. The delegated dependencies define all the functional and non-functional 
requirements of the system.  
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Regarding the proposed extensions, security constraints are imposed to the system-
to-be (by taking into account the security diagram) and these constraints are further 
analysed according to the security constraint analysis processes [35], and security goals 
and entities necessary for the system to guarantee the security constraints are identified.   
The main goal of the eSAP system (see Figure 8) is to Automate Care, and therefore 
help professionals provide faster and more efficient care, and also allow older people get 
more involved in their care.  
 
Fig. 8. eSAP System Partial Analysis 
Taking into consideration the security reference diagram (see Figure 5) there are three 
main constraints imposed (by the desired security features of the system- privacy, 
integrity and availability) to the eSAP’s main goal - Keep Data Integrity, Keep Data 
Available and Keep Data Private. For the eSAP to satisfy these constraints three secure 
goals have been identified. Ensure Data Integrity, Ensure Data Availability and 
Ensure Data Privacy.  
This example focuses only on the Keep Data Private security constraint. This 
security constraint can be further analysed to security sub-constraints: Allow Only 
Encrypted Data Transfer, Allow Only Authorised Access, and Allow Access Only 
to Personal Care Plan. Taking into account the security reference diagram, secure 
goals are introduced to help towards the satisfaction of the imposed security constraints. 
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Thus the secure goals Use Cryptography, Check Authorisation, Check Access 
Control, and Check Information Flow are introduced.  In addition, some of the secure 
goals are further analysed in terms of secure tasks. 
For instance, the Use Cryptography goal is divided to two secure tasks: Encrypt 
Data and Decrypt Data. Although these tasks could be furthered decomposed by 
indicating for example the type of the encryption algorithm this is not the case in this 
stage, since the type of the encryption algorithm depends on the implementation of the 
system and it will restrict the designers of the system in a particular implementation style.  
Moreover, the Check Authorisation goal is decomposed into four secure tasks: 
Check Password, Check Digital Signatures, Check Biometrics and Call Back. 
However, it is indicated in the diagram that the last two tasks contribute negatively 
towards the mobility of the system, and this is one factor that the developers must take 
into consideration in the implementation of the system.     
5.3.    Architectural Design 
The architectural design involves (1) the addition of new actors, in which new actors are 
added to make the system interact with the external actors; (2) actor decomposition, in 
which each actor is described in detail with respect to their goals and tasks; (3) 
capabilities identification, in which capabilities needed by the actors to fulfil their goals 
are identified; and (4) agent assignment, in which a set of agent types is defined and each 
agent is assigned one or more capabilities.  
From the security point of view, we identify the security constraints and secure 
entities that the new actors introduce and also during the actor decomposition we identify 
security sub-constraints and sub-entities. In addition secure capabilities are identified and 
assigned to each agent of the system. Moreover, during the architectural design the 
developers should decide for the architecture of their system. As mentioned earlier, such 
a decision should take into account the security requirements of the system. In other 
words, an architectural style that satisfies as much as possible the system’s security 
requirements should be chosen. Although, there are different ways to determine that and 
in general it is left to the developers, a process that involves the evaluation of different 
architectural styles with respect to the security requirements of the system has been 
proposed [50]. The analysis that took place following this process, has identified [35] that 
a client server architectural style would satisfy more the security requirements of the 
eSAP system, than for example a mobile agent architectural style. As a result, the system 
has been designed with this consideration in mind.     
It was derived from the late requirements stage that one of the system’s secure goals 
is to Ensure Data Privacy.  Responsibility for the achievement of this goal is delegated 
from the eSAP to the newly introduced sub-actor Privacy Manager.  
The Privacy Manager has four main secure goals (see Figure 9), Check 
Authorisation, Check Access Control, Check Information Flow and Use 
Cryptography. Therefore, the Privacy Manager is decomposed and responsibilities for 
the satisfaction of these secure goals are delegated to the Authorisation Manager, 
20    Haralambos Mouratidis, Paolo Giorgini 
Access Control Manager, Information Flow Manager and Cryptography Manager 
respectively.  
 
Fig. 9. Actors’ decomposition diagram 
For each new (sub) actor introduced in the system, an extended diagram is required to 
capture the dependencies of the new actor with the already existing actors of the system. 
Figure 10 shows a part (focused on the privacy) of the extended diagram for the task 
Access Care Plan Info of the Professional actor (see Figure 7). The Care Plan 
Manager is responsible for providing the Professional access to the Care Plan Info. It 
depends on the Authorisation Manager to deal with authorisation procedures, on the 
Access Control Manager and the Information Flow Manager to perform access 
control checks and information flow checks respectively, and on the Cryptography 
Manager for encrypting and decrypting information. 
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Fig. 10. Extended diagram with respect to “Access Care Plan Info” task 
The next step in the architectural design is to identify (secure) capabilities for each 
actor. Taking into consideration the extended actor diagram (Figure 10), each 
dependency relationship can give place to one or more capabilities triggered by external 
events.  The actors along with their capabilities with respect to the extended diagram of 
Figure 10 are shown in Table 1.  
When the actors along with their capabilities have been identified the next step is the 
agents’ assignment. A set of agent types are defined and each one of them is assigned one 
or more different capabilities (Table 2) with respect to the capabilities identified in the 
previous step (Table 1). 
Table 1. Actors and their Capabilities 
 Actors Capability Cap. ID 
Professional Provide Care Plan Info Request 1 
 Provide Authorisation Details 2 
 Obtain Care Plan Info 3 
Care Plan Manager Obtain Care Plan Info Request 4 
 Provide Care Plan Info 5 
 Request Encryption of Data 6 
 Obtain Encrypted Data 7 
 Request Decryption of Data 8 
 Obtain Plain Data 9 
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 Obtain Authorisation Clearance 10 
 Obtain Access Control Clearance 11 
 Obtain Information Flow 
Clearance 
12 
Cryptography Manager Encrypt Data 13 
 Decrypt Data 14 
Information Flow Manager Provide Information Flow 
Clearance 
15 
Access Control Manager Provide Access Control Clearance 16 
Authorisation Manager Obtain Authorisation Details 17 
 Provide Authorisation Clearance 18 
5.4.   Detailed Design 
From the security point of view, during the detailed design the developers specify the 
agent capabilities and interactions taking into account the security aspects derived from 
the previous steps of the analysis. In doing so AUML [3] notation is employed.  The only 
difference is the introduction of security rules.  These are similar to the business rules that 
UML has for defining constraints on the diagrams (see for instance Figure 11). In this 
case, security constraints can be formally expressed (and verified) with the aid of the 
Object Constraint Language (OCL). However, for reasons of simplicity we present here 
the security constraints with the aid of notes as shown in Figure 11.  
Table 2. Agents and their capabilities 
Agent Capabilities 
Professional 1,2,3 
Care Plan Agent 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
Privacy Agent 13,14,15,16,17,18 
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Fig. 11. An example of a security rule modelled in a sequence diagram 
6.   Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we presented Secure Tropos, an extension to Tropos methodology, 
which allows developers to consider security issues throughout the development process 
of multiagent systems. Secure Tropos provides a well-guided process, consisting of 
various modelling activities, which allows developers to consider security issues during 
the development of multiagent systems. The key point on the security process of Secure 
Tropos is the usage of the same concepts and notations throughout the development 
stages. The usage of the same concepts together with the definition of the relationships 
between those concepts allows us to validate the solution in different ways. First of all, 
by tracking the developed solution all the way back to the security requirements and the 
security policy. This allows validation of the design by making sure that all the security 
policy rules are considered by the security solution. Although this does not guarantee a 
100% secure system, such a claim cannot be made by any approach or any system, it 
guarantees that the developed design takes into account all the security requirements of 
the system, and appropriate capabilities are given to the agents of the system (and thus on 
the system) to satisfy these requirements. Secondly, the developers can validate each of 
the development steps by following a set of consistency and validation rules that have 
been proposed [35] for the security process.  
The above validation processes are supported by automated techniques and tools to 
assist developers during the development. In particular, a security pattern language has 
been developed [35] to assist developers in transforming the analysis specification to a 
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design by applying proven solutions in a systematic and structured way. Moreover, 
Security Attack Scenarios [35] have been proposed and integrated into the Secure Tropos 
process to validate the security solution against the system’s security requirements. In 
addition, formal definition of the methodology’s concepts is supported using the formal 
Tropos language and an automated tool, T-Tool [16], allows the automatic consistency 
validation of the specifications and it assists developers in identifying whether the 
proposed solution respects a number of desired security properties. T-Tool animations 
can also be used to give the user immediate feedback on its implications.     
This is an ongoing research and more work is required to achieve our aim, which is to 
provide a well guided process of integrating security and functional requirements 
throughout the development stages of multiagent systems. Currently, we are working on 
refining the process, to make it applicable even by developers with minimum knowledge 
of security.  
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Appendix 
The proposed transformation system, defines the construction of the security 
reference diagram in terms of a graph transformation [2], in which a diagram (graph) is 
progressively derived through subsequent more and more precise versions of it, according 
to the application of a set of rules to the diagram. Such rules are called graph 
transformation rules and a precise definition can be found in [2]. It is worth mentioning 
that the security reference diagram transformation system is based on the graph 
transformation system introduced by Andries et al. [2], and the analysis proposed for 
Tropos’ actor and goal diagrams by Bresciani and Giorgini [6]. Moreover, regarding the 
transformation rules, the notion of a graph transformation rule proposed by Bresciani and 
Giorgini [6] for Tropos diagrams is followed. 
Formally, the security reference diagram can be represented as a special case of a labelled 
directed diagram >ΕΝ=< ltsG ,,,, , where  
• N is a finite set of nodes that can be connected by one or more edges of the finite set 
E; 
s and t are two functions that assign the source and the target node to each node 
respectively Ν→Ε:,ts ;  
l represents a label function for each of the nodes and edges. In addition, for the security 
reference diagram we can assume that >→<Ν∪Ε LTl ,: , where T = {SecurityFeatures, 
SecurityThreats, Protection Objectives, SecurityMechanisms} and L represents a set of 
identifiers.  
In addition, a graph transformation rule is defined as a pair ,r L R= , where L and R are 
graphs called the left-hand-side (LHS) and the right-hand-side (RHS) of the rule. From 
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the analysis done by Bresciani and Giorgini [6] it derives that a graph H can be obtained 
from a graph G by the application of a set of transformation rules { }1,..., nP r r= as 
P P
G H or  in the case G is the empty graph.  
However, such a derivation process is non-deterministic due to the choice of a 
particular rule, at each step. Additionally, the chosen rule might be applicable to several 
occurrences of the graph’s LHS [2]. To control this kind of non-determinism during the 
construction of the security reference diagram, we have assigned a set of priority rules:  









The application of this rule results in the introduction of a new security feature (SF) in the 
RHS graph.  











    The application of this rule results in the introduction of a security threat (ST) in the 
RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node.  
Rule 3: Introduce the protection objectives and associate them with the security features 
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
: { },{},{},{},{ ,* }
: { , },{ },{ },{ },{ ,* , ,* , }
LHS n n SF
RHS n n e e n e n n SF n PO e PosCon ε
< < > >
< < > < > < >

    
 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a protection objective (PO) in 
the RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node. 
Rule 4: Introduce the security mechanisms and associate them with the protection 
objectives 
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
: { },{},{},{},{ ,* }
: { , },{ },{ },{ },{ ,* , ,* , }
LHS n n PO
RHS n n e e n e n n PO n SM e PosCon ε
< < > >
< < > < > < >

    
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a security mechanism (SM) in 
the RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node. 
Rule 5: Decompose the security mechanisms to security sub-mechanisms  
1 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
: { , },{},{},{},{ ,* }
: { , },{ },{ },{ },{ ,* , , }
i
i
LHS n n n SM
RHS n n e e n e n n SM e AND DEC ε
< < > >
< < > < − >

   
 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of new node(s) and edge(s) 
associated with the security mechanisms of the diagram.  
 
Taking into account the above transformation system rules, we have developed an 
algorithm (shown in Figure 12) for the construction of the security reference diagram. 
The algorithm works as follows: First all the known security features are applied to the 
diagram. Then the threats are applied to the diagram and the contribution links between 
Secure Tropos: A Security-Oriented Extension of the Tropos Methodology      29 
the threats and the security features are indicated. Then the protection objectives and their 
associations to the security features are applied. Finally, the security mechanism are 
introduced and associated to the protection objectives, and if necessary they are further 
analysed to security sub-mechanisms. This process assumes that the developers know all 
the elements of the diagram prior to its construction. However, most likely the developers 
will come across some new required security issues after the application of a specific 
rule. For instance, a security feature can be identified after the application of the security 
feature rule (rule 1). To avoid a delay in the analysis, it is convenient sometimes to allow 
some simple exceptions. Thus, it may be preferable to introduce the new node (by 
applying the corresponding rule) and then continue with the rest of the rules. For this 
reason, we have introduced to our algorithm an outer REPEAT loop to deal with 
situations where the application of one rule for a particular node, might require the 
application of a rule for another node.  
 
BEGIN  
Initialise Graph G (**should be empty in the initialisation process**) 
  REPEAT 
REPEAT  
‘choose rule 1’; 
‘choose an occurrence’ i for the application of rule 1;  
 G: = (G\I(L\R)+ I(R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired graph or no rule 1, for no occurrence i, remains; 
REPEAT 
‘choose rule 2’; 
‘choose an occurrence’ i for the application of rule 2; 
G: = (G \ I (L\R) + I (R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 2, for no occurrence i, remains; 
REPEAT 
‘choose rule 3’; 
‘choose an occurrence’ i for the application of rule 3; 
  G: = (G \ I (L\R) + I (R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 3, for no occurrence i, remains; 
REPEAT  
‘choose rule 4’; 
‘choose an occurrence’ i for the application of rule 4; 
  G: = (G \ I (L\R) + I (R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 4, for no occurrence i, remains; 
REPEAT  
‘choose rule 5’; 
‘choose an occurrence’ i for the application of rule 5; 
  G: = (G \ I (L\R) + I (R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 5, for no occurrence i, remains; 
  UNTIL all rules are satisfied for all occurrences; 
END 
Fig. 12. The algorithm for the construction of the security reference diagram 
 
